El Siglo Futuro - News from Madrid, Spain and the World

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Ukraine’s campaign against Russian oil infrastructure has developed into a direct assault on one of Moscow’s most important economic arteries. The focus is not on symbolic targets but on the nodes through which a large share of Russian crude exports is loaded and shipped. Pressure on the Baltic outlets of Primorsk and Ust-Luga is especially significant because they handle a major part of seaborne exports. Add the after-effects of the disruption around Novorossiysk, interruptions in the Druzhba corridor on Ukrainian territory, and growing pressure on tankers linked to Russia’s shadow fleet, and the picture becomes larger than a handful of dramatic fires. What is under attack is the export chain itself: storage, loading, routing, maritime dispatch and ultimately cash flow.Current estimates indicate that roughly 40 percent of Russia’s oil export capacity has at times been disrupted or temporarily knocked offline. That amounts to around 2 million barrels per day that failed to reach the market as planned or had to be rerouted with delay and higher cost. For the Kremlin, this matters because oil is not merely a commodity; it remains one of the pillars of federal revenue. When terminals go down, ships queue, cargoes must be reassigned and transport risks rise, the economic impact widens even if part of the volume is later recovered. The strikes therefore hit the area where Russia, despite sanctions, price caps and alternative shipping arrangements, has tried hardest to preserve hard-currency income.What makes the Ukrainian approach notable is that it is designed less for one-off spectacle than for repeated operational disruption. Every hit on port infrastructure, pumping systems, storage tanks or loading chains can create bottlenecks far beyond the point of impact. A delay of only a few days can alter tanker rotations, export schedules, settlement timing and production planning. The fact that one facility may resume operations relatively quickly does not remove the vulnerability exposed by the pattern. Moscow is being forced to reshuffle volumes, test alternative routes and absorb added risk at nearly every step of the process. That is a structural problem for an export model that depends heavily on a limited set of maritime hubs.